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The Key to Unlocking the Partial Lockout:
A Discussion of the NLRB's Decisions in
Midwest Generation and Bunting Bearings
C. Quincy Ewell*
I. Introduction
Collective bargaining consists of negotiations between an employer
and a group of employees,' who are usually represented by a labor union,
in an effort to determine the conditions of employment.2 Collective
bargaining is governed by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or
the Act), which sets forth guidelines permitting and proscribing certain
activity.3 In other words, when an employer and labor union sit down to
negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement-the final covenant
reached between the employer and the employees-employers and
employees are justified in taking some actions but not others.4 For
instance, while collective bargaining, a labor union must bargain in good
* J.D. Candidate, The Dickinson School of Law of the Pennsylvania State
University, 2008; B.A., magna cum laude, Sociology, Howard University, 2005. The
author would like to thank his family, especially Doris and Tiffany, for all their love,
support, and encouragement. The author would also like to thank Kris Harrison for her
insightful suggestions and advice in developing this Comment.
1. See generally HAROLD W. DAVEY ET AL., CONTEMPORARY COLLECTIVE
BARGAINING 3-4 (4th ed. 1982) (discussing the parties in collective bargaining).
2. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006) ("[T]o bargain collectively is the performance of
the mutual obligation of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment .. "); see also DAVEY, supra note 1, at 2.
Collective bargaining is defined as a continuing institutional relationship
between an employer.., and a labor organization.., representing exclusively
a defined group of employees... concerned with the negotiation,
administration, interpretation, and enforcement of written agreements covering
joint understandings as to wages or salaries, rates of pay, hours of work, and
other conditions of employment.
Id.
3. See 29 U.S.C. § 158 (2006).
4. Id.
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faith and an employer may not discourage union membership; that is, an
employer cannot make advantages such as work, health benefits,
overtime, and other benefits available to non-union members while not
making the same advantages available to union members.5 To do so not
only would discourage union membership but also is an unfair labor
practice.6
In Fall 2004, the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB or the
Board) upheld in Midwest Generation7 and Bunting Bearings8 the
conduct of two employers who locked out its union employees while
allowing its non-union employees to work.9 In effect, these decisions
held that the employers were justified in adversely treating its union-
member employees while favorably treating non-union-member
employees. 10 So, what is the significance of the holdings in Midwest
Generation and Bunting Bearings to the employer that employs union-
represented workers? Surprisingly, the decisions mean nothing because,
appropriately, federal courts in the D.C. and Seventh Circuits overturned
the Board's rulings."
Although the courts reversed these partial lockout cases, the state of
the lockout and partial lockout doctrine is far from clear. Thus, this
Comment will explain the evolution of the lockout and partial lockout
doctrine as well as their current function in the realm of labor bargaining.
In addition, this Comment will examine Board's decisions in these
NLRB decisions that left many employers confused as to the application,
if any, of the partial lockout in the collective bargaining process. While
these two decisions were ultimately reversed by the federal circuit courts,
their examination is important for two reasons. First, they provide
insight into the Board's inconsistent application of the partial lockout
doctrine and second, they illustrate the pitfalls of expanding the partial
lockout doctrine. Fortunately, the circuit courts recognized and corrected
these pitfalls before they affected more than just the parties in Midwest
Generation and Bunting Bearings.
II. Background
The following sections depict a brief overview of the evolution of
5. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (2006).
6. See id.
7. Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. 69 (Sept. 30, 2004).
8. Bunting Bearings Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. 479 (Oct. 29, 2004).
9. See generally Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. 69; Bunting Bearings Corp.,
343 N.L.R.B. 479.
10. See id.
11. See generally Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 429 F.3d 651 (7th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 42 (2006); United Steel, Paper and Forestry v. NLRB,
No. 04-1435, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 11221, at *5 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 28, 2006).
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the lockout doctrine. The first part will set out the sections of the NLRA
and NLRB Rules and Regulations that are important to understanding
this Comment. Also included within this section are cases that helped
shape the lockout and partial lockout doctrines, as they exist today. Of
course this synopsis does not include all the complexities, or cases,
interpreting the NLRA, the Board, or the lockout doctrine, but hopefully
it will provide sufficient background to follow along with the Comment.
A. The National Labor Relations Act
The NLRA governs labor relations between employers and
employees.' Section 7 of the Act grants employees the right to engage
in concerted activity when assisting labor unions in collective
bargaining. 3 Section 8 of the Act protects this right.' 4 Section 8(a)(1)
makes it unlawful for an employer to interfere with an employee's
section 7 rights,' 5 and section 8(a)(3) proscribes any discrimination
intended to encourage or discourage union membership "in regard to hire
or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment."'
16
A basic tenet of the NLRA requires good-faith bargaining; in other
words, once a union is recognized as the collective bargaining
representative of the employees, the union and the employer must
bargain in "good faith."' 17 This good-faith standard has changed over the
12. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006). See also Windward Shipping (London) Ltd.
v. Am. Radio Ass'n, 415 U.S. 104, 118 n.4 (1974) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that
the NLRA's objective is to protect employers, employees and the public); Int'l
Longshoremen's Local 1416 v. Ariadne Shipping Co., 397 U.S. 195, 198-99 (1970)
(stating that the NLRA primarily concerns strife between American employers and
employees).
13. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
14. Id. § 158(a)(1).
15.- Id.
16. Id. § 158(a)(3) (2006). In 1934, Senator Wagner introduced the NLRA, formerly
known as the Wagner Act, for the purpose of obtaining federal support for "employee
organizing and collective bargaining." 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 25-27 (Patrick
Hardin & John E. Higgins, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2001). Among the most important rights
promoted by Senator Wagner, and later adopted by the NLRA, afford employees: (1) "the
right to organize"; (2) "the right to bargain collectively"; and (3) the right to engage in
concerted activity such as strikes and picketing. Id. at 27. According to Senator Wagner,
affording employees these rights would equalize the bargaining power between
employers and employees. Id.
17. See 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006). See also Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargain in
Good Faith, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1401, 1410 (1958) (noting that in the days following the
enactment of the Wagner Act, employers politely met with the union representatives,
listened to their demands and the supporting arguments and then rejected them). Finding
such conduct reprehensible, the NLRB responded in NLRB v. George P. Pilling & Son
Co., 119 F.2d 32, 37 (3d Cir. 1941). Setting discernible boundaries for the meaning of
"good-faith" bargaining, the George P. Pilling Board ruled that "[t]here must be a
common willingness among the parties to discuss freely and fully their respective claims
2008]
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years. Initially, the Ninth Circuit in NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,' 8
defined the duty of good faith as "the obligation of the parties to
participate actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present
intention to find a basis for agreement, and a sincere effort must be made
to reach a common ground."' 9 In furtherance of this principle, the Ninth
Circuit, citing NLRB v. Reed & Price Mfg. Co.,20 stated that bargaining in
good faith implies a duty to bargain with "an open mind and a sincere
desire to reach an agreement.",2' Congress thought, however, that an
employer complied with this duty only when it was "willing to make
reasonable concessions. 22 Accordingly, in 1947, Congress amended the
NLRA to provide that the obligation to bargain in good faith "does not
compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a
concession.,
23
Thereafter, the Board and courts understood Congress's amendment
to mean that the parties were obligated to bargain in good faith, and
when bargaining was futile, "each had a right to resort to economic
warfare." 24 For the union, "economic warfare" meant striking, picketing,
or boycotting the employer; for the employer, economic warfare meant
locking out its employees or temporarily shutting down the business.
2 5
When a union or employer believes that its adversary has violated
the NLRA by committing an unfair labor practice in the course of
bargaining-for instance, by breaching its duty to bargain in good
faith-it may file a charge against the party with the NLRB alleging an
unfair labor practice.2 6
B. Filing a Charge for an Unfair Labor Practice
Filing a charge with the NLRB is akin to filing a complaint with a
court. Anybody-an individual, an employer, or a labor organization-
and demands and, when these are opposed, to justify them on reason." Id. at 37.
18. NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d 676, 686 (9th Cir. 1943).
19. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 F.2d at 686.
20. NLRB v. Reed & Price Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874, 885 (1st Cir. 1941).
21. Reed & Price Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d at 875.
22. Cox, supra note 17, at 1415.
23. Id.
24. New NLRB Rulings on Management Lockouts, Federal Employment Law
Insider, Dec. 2004, available at 2 NO. 4 Fed. Emp. L. Insider 6 on Westlaw.
25. Id. See also 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 1513-14 (Patrick Hardin & John E.
Higgins, Jr. eds., 4th ed. 2001) (noting that the NLRA, in its original form, proscribed the
use of lockouts as it was considered to be an unfair labor practice when used to obstruct
protected activity. This provision, however, was subsequently rejected by Congress
because Congress thought it was unfair to prohibit the lockout while protecting the
strike.).
26. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2006).
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may file a charge alleging an unfair labor practice.27 Federal regulations
supplementing the NLRA require that the charge be filed with the
regional director in which the alleged unfair labor practices have
occurred28 within six months of the unfair labor practice. 29 The charging
party should be prepared to submit a written statement of the relevant
facts, which includes the name and address of the person or organization
against whom the charge is made. 30 Thereafter, the regional director will
serve copies of the charge upon the charged parties.31 After the charged
party files an answer, the NLRB commences an investigation that
includes interviews with parties and witnesses.32 After the investigation
is completed, if the case cannot be disposed of informally, the regional
office may institute a proceeding before the Board.33
C. The National Labor Relations Board
The NLRA created the NLRB to enforce the substantive provisions
of the Act.34 Section 160(c) of the NLRA expressly delegates to the
Board the primary responsibility of crafting remedial decisions that
manifest the policies of the Act.35 Such a delegation affords the Board
wide discretion to fashion remedies for violations of the NLRA,3 6
although Board discretion is subject to judicial review. 37  That said,
although Article III courts may review Board decisions,38 the Board's
unique expertise in labor disputes entitles it to a significant degree of
deference in its choice of remedy. 39 Specifically, the Board's discretion
to animate remedies can neither be arbitrary nor capricious.40
27. See id.
28. See NLRB Rules and Regulations, 29 C.F.R. § 102.10 (2006).
29. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (2006).
30. 29 C.F.R. § 102.12 (2006).
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. KENNETH McGUINESS, HOW TO TAKE A CASE BEFORE THE NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS BOARD 238 (4th ed. 1976). If an investigation reveals merit in a charge, the
more favored practice is for the NLRB agent to remedy the unfair labor practices, thereby
eliminating the necessity for further proceedings. Id. at 243.
34. See 29 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2006).
35. Seeid. § 160(c).
36. NLRB v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 191 F.3d 316, 323 (2d Cir. 1999).
37. Id. at 324.
38. Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 142-143 (2002).
39. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 191 F.3d at 323-24; see also NLRB v. Gissel Packing
Co., 395 U.S. 575, 612 n.32 (1969) ("In fashioning its remedies under the ... [NLRA],
the Board draws on a fund of knowledge and expertise and all its own, and its choice of
remedy must therefore be given special respect by reviewing courts.").
40. Shaw Coll. at Detroit, Inc. v. NLRB, 623 F.2d 488, 489 (6th Cir. 1980).
2008]
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D. Judicial Review of Board Decisions
When a court reviews the Board's decision in a labor dispute, it
reviews the administrative record to determine whether the Board has
based its decision on sensible explanations and "whether the decision is
adequately supported by the facts. '41 A reviewing court will adopt the
Board's decision only if it is supported by "substantial evidence on the
record., 42  Reviewing courts will reverse Board decisions only when
circumstances indicate that the Board has committed a clear error in
judgment or has failed to consider factors relevant to the case.43
E. Exploring the Lockout
Labor law jurisprudence has long recognized that employers and
workers have competing interests.44 In governing these competing
interests, the NLRA establishes a collective bargaining process in which
economic weapons are made available to employers and employees.45
Specifically, the NLRA armed workers with the right to strike 46-which
exists when a group of employees cease work in order to secure
compliance with a demand regarding employment conditions.47
Conversely, courts carved out an economic weapon for employers that
permitted them to lockout their employees.48 An employer's ability to
use a lockout, however, is not statutorily protected like its counter-
41. Nat'l Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 363 F.3d 468,
474 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43) (1983) ("Under [the arbitrary and capricious standard], we look to
whether the [Board] has offered a rational explanation for its decision, whether its
decision is based on consideration of the relevant factors, and whether the decision is
adequately supported by the facts found.").
42. 5 U.S.C. § 7123(c) (2006).
43. NLRB v. Sch. Bus Servs., Inc., No. 93-70936, 1995 U.S. App. LEXIS 439, at *3
(9th Cir. Jan. 9, 1995) (stating that a rational connection between the facts found and the
choice made must exist).
44. See Michael H. Leroy, Lockouts Involving Replacement Workers: An Empirical
Analysis and Proposal to Balance Economic Weapons Under the NLRA, 74 WASH. U. L.
Q. 981, 983 (1996).
45. See id.; see also NLRB v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960)
("The presence of economic weapons in reserve, and their actual resistance on occasion
by the parties, is part and parcel of the system that the Wagner and Taft-Harley Acts
[now the NLRA] have recognized.").
46. Section 163 of the NLRA provides: "Nothing in this [Act]... shall be construed
so as to either interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike .... 29
U.S.C. § 163 (2006).
47. See Am. Mfg. Concern, 7 N.L.R.B. 753,759 (1938).
48. See Ellen Dannin, From Dictator Game to Ultimatum Game... and Back
Again: The Judicial Impasse Amendments, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 241, 250-52 (2004)
(discussing how courts have come to recognize and shape the legality of employers' use
of the lockout).
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weapon, the strike.49
At common law, a lockout was defined as a "cessation of the
furnishings of work to employees in an effort to get the employer more
desirable terms." 50 Currently, labor law lacks a succinct definition of the
term.5' With this in mind, and relying on the Board's unique expertise in
labor law,52 Congress thought it would be best for the Board to define
what circumstances constitute a lockout.53  However, the Board only
made matters worse by its inconsistent application of the conditions
necessary to find a lockout.54 Nevertheless, the Board and courts broadly
define the term "lockout" as the "withholding of employment by an
employer from its employees for the purpose of either resisting their
demands or gaining a concession from them. 55  In other words, an
employer institutes a lockout when it uses only a portion of its employees
to maintain its operation.56 Defining "lockout" has proven to be the easy
part, while the difficult task-the task with which the Board and courts
continue to wrestle-is determining the scope of its application.
57
F. The Scope of the Lockout
As noted above, the NLRA institutes a collective bargaining process
established by a set of countervailing economic weapons available to
employees and employers, 8 i.e., employees may strike to defend their
49. Id. at 251 ("No statute protects an employer's right to lockout employees.").
50. Iron Molders Local 125 v. Allis-Chalmers Co., 166 F.45, 52 (7th Cir. 1908).
51. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1512.
52. See Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 191 F.3d at 323-24.
53. See Inter-Collegiate Press, Graphic Arts Div. v. NLRB, 486 F.2d 837, 842 n.8
(8th Cir. 1973) (noting that the lockout and its use is restricted by the Board to defined
circumstances).
54. See Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335, 1359 (1943) (referring to a
situation as a lockout where an employer locked out its employees in anticipation of a
strike that would have caused spoilage of syrup to be used in the manufacture of soft
drinks); Int'l Shoe Co., 93 N.L.R.B. 907, 909 (1951) (justifying an employer for locking
out its employees to defend against intermittent walk-outs by its employees); Lengel-
Fencil Co., 8 N.L.R.B. 988, 995 (1938) (concluding that the employer's closing of the
plant was a direct result of an argument between the employer and union representative).
But see Link-Belt Co., 26 N.L.R.B. 227, 261-65 (1940) (justifying the employer's
lockout because of economic considerations).
55. Dayton Newspapers, Inc. v. NLRB, 402 F.3d 651, 664 (6th Cir. 2005) (citing 2
THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1512).
56. ROBERT A. GORMAN & MATTHEW W. FINKIN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW:
UNIONIZING AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING 482 (2nd ed. 2004); see also Associated Gen.
Contractors, Ga. Branch, 138 N.L.R.B. 1432, 1442 (1962) ("The term 'lockout' has been
used in more recent years to denote a temporary layoff of employees as distinguished
from a discharge of severance of the employment relationship.").
57. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
58. See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text.
2008]
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bargaining position; employers may lockout their employees. 59 Incident
to this quasi-equalization of employer rights and union rights is both the
obligation of both the employer and the union to adhere to the policies of
the NLRA-"to promote [peaceful] settlement[s] of labor disputes
through collective bargaining. 6 ° Consequently, employers, in particular,
must make "meaningful" decisions regarding what, when, and how to
defend against union-represented employees exercising their § 7 rights.61
For example, if the employer chooses to defend against a strike by
locking out its employees, the employer is obliged to decide when the
lockout is implemented and who the lockout effects. More importantly,
the employer must have a reasonable and well-founded purpose for
locking out only some of its employees. 62  In the absence of a well-
founded reason, the employer would be walking a fine line for having
implemented a partial lockout for a wrongful purpose.63
The Board has long insisted that lockouts for wrongful purposes are
unlawful. 64 For instance, in Joseph Weinstein Elec. Corp., the Board
found that a lockout used to defeat union organizing efforts as a means of
evading the duty to bargain was unlawful.65 Likewise, in Am. Cyanamid
Co., the Board found a lockout unlawful where its purpose was to
compel acceptance of an agreement that would have condoned an unfair
labor practice and required the union to relinquish statutory rights.66 On
the other hand, the Board has upheld lockouts that were motivated by
legitimate business reasons.
67
59. See Dannin, supra note 48, at 250-52.
60. NLRB v. Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., 424 F.2d 109, 113 (5th Cir.
1970); see also 29 U.S.C. 151 (declaring the policy of the NLRA).
61. I. HERBERT ROTHENBERG & STEVEN B. SILVERMAN, LABOR UNIONS: How To:
AVERT THEM, BEAT THEM, OUT-NEGOTIATE THEM, LIVE WITH THEM, UNLOAD THEM 244
(Management Relations, Inc. 1973) (1979) (asserting that this quasi-equalization of
employer and union rights forces the employer to make many meaningful decisions); see
also 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006) (stating that employees have the right to engage in concerted
activity, including assisting labor unions in collective bargaining).
62. See Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 429 F.3d at 659 (stating that an
employer must provide a legal and reasonable basis for implementing a partial lockout).
63. See discussion infra Part III.F.
64. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1514-16 (reviewing, at
length, cases where the employer's lockout was instituted for an unlawful purpose); see
also id. at 1514 ("From the earliest days to the present the Board has declared lockouts to
be unlawful where they have an unlawful purpose.").
65. See generally Joseph Weinstein Elec. Corp., 152 N.L.R.B. 25, 37 (1965); see
also Bagel Bakers Council of Greater N.Y., 174 N.L.R.B. 622, 627, 632 (1969) (finding a
lockout unlawful where the employer, motivated by antiunion animus, transferred work
from union employees to non-union employees).
66. Am. Cyanamid Co. v. NLRB, 592 F.2d 356, 363 (7th Cir. 1979).
67. See Betts Cadillac Olds, Inc., 96 N.L.R.B. 269 (1951) (holding that a lockout
was lawful where an anticipated strike among automobile service and repair personnel
would have left customers' cars disassembled); see also Chicago Local No. 458-3M,
[Vol. 112:3
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Three types of lockouts exist. 68 The first lockout is used to frustrate
organizational efforts, subvert the bargaining representative, or sidestep
the duty to bargain. 69 The second type of lockout, referred to as the
"bargaining lockout," is used during bargaining negotiations.
70
Employers use this lockout as economic counterweapon "to the union's
right to strike.' Finally, the third lockout, the "economic lockout,"
occurs when the employer's objective is to "minimize economic or
operational losses threatened by an imminent strike.,
72
G. Not Once but Twice: In Two Cases Decided on the Same Day, the
Supreme Court Interprets the Scope of the Lockout
On one day in March 1965, the Supreme Court handed down two
holdings that, for the first time, set discernible parameters for courts,
employers, and unions to assess the legality and reasonableness of the
73lockout as a weapon in collective bargaining. Validating the lockout as
an offensive weapon in collective bargaining, the Supreme Court decided
Am. Ship Bldg. v. NLRB and NLRB v. Brown.
74
1. Am. Ship Bldg. v. NLRB: The Landmark Case Interpreting the
Permissible Use of the Lockout
In Am. Ship Bldg., in order to secure a new collective bargaining
agreement, the employer and the unions entered into negotiations.75 On
the eve of the current contract's expiration, the employer made a
proposal that was countered by a proposal from the unions.76 Thereafter,
multiple negotiations ensued between the employer and union, but no
terms were agreed upon, causing the parties to separate "without setting a
Graphic Commc'n Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. NLRB, 206 F.3d 22, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000)
(holding that the employer's eleven month lockout, which the employer ceased after
entering into a new collective bargaining agreement, was lawful because its purpose was
to apply economic pressure on the employees in support of its legitimate bargaining
position).





73. See 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1520; see also Am. Ship
Bldg. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300 (1965); NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965).
74. Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. 300; Brown, 380 U.S. 278; see Leroy, supra note 44, at
1002 (stating that the Supreme Court legitimized the use of the lockout); see also 2 THE
DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1520 (noting that the lockout gained new
significance in the year Am. Ship Bldg. and Brown were decided).
75. Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 303.
76. Id.
2008]
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date for further meetings. 77  The parties had reached a bargaining
impasse. 78 Fearing that the union would strike as it had in the past, the
employer temporarily closed down one yard and laid off employees at
others.79 Subsequently, the union filed claims alleging violations of the
NLRA.8° The Board held that the lockout was unlawful because it
infringed on employees' rights to strike and bargain collectively.
8 1
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Board's
conclusion.82 The Court held that, because the union failed to allege that
the employer used the lockout adversely to the collective bargaining
process and because the record was devoid of any findings the employer
was hostile to its employees' right to strike, it was inaccurate for the
Board to hold that the employer's intention was to destroy or frustrate the
process of collective bargaining.
83
The rule extracted from the Court's decision was that an employer
may lawfully lockout out its union employees temporarily for the sole
purpose of applying economic pressure to support its bargaining
84position. Setting the parameters for assessing the legality of an
employer's use of the lockout, the Court opined that a proper
determination of a lockout requires a distinction to be drawn between the
employer's intention to support its bargaining position and the
employer's hostility toward the collective bargaining process-hostility
which could suffice to render a lockout unlawful. Moreover, the Court
distinguished the facts of Am. Ship Bldg. from the situation where an




78. 1 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 16, at 25-27 ("Where there are
irreconcilable differences in the parties' positions after full good faith negotiations, the
law recognizes the existence of an impasse.").
79. Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 304.
80. Id.
81. Am. Ship Bldg., Co. v. NLRB, 142 N.L.R.B. 1362, 1365 (1963).
82. See Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 312-14. The issue before the Court in Am. Ship
Bdlg. was whether it was lawful for an employer, after an impasse had been reached, to
lockout some employees by temporarily laying them off as means of applying economic
pressure on the union in support of the employer's bargaining position. See id. at 308.
83. Id. at 308-10.
84. Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 318.
85. Id.
86. Id. at 309. The Court also found that the lockout used by the employer in Am.
Ship Bldg. was not "one of those acts which are demonstrably so destructive of collective
bargaining that the Board need not inquire into employer motivation .... Id.
[Vol. 112:3
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2. Earlier That Afternoon... NLRB v. Brown: Establishing the
Standard of Review in Determining the Lawfulness of a Lockout
The Brown decision set the stage for the application of the lockout
doctrine as it is enforced today. 87 Holding that, in response to a whipsaw
strike, members of multi-member bargaining unit were justified in hiring
temporary employees, 88 the Court advanced the "inherently-destructive-
conduct standard," which is the foundation of the model that courts use
today to evaluate employer conduct in the context of asserted NLRA
violations.89
Analogously to Am. Ship Bldg., the facts of Brown lacked specific
evidence of the employer's intent to discourage union participation.
90
Thus, the Court had to consider whether unlawful intent could be
inferred from employer's use of the lockout. 91 In finding that the use of a
defensive lockout with temporary replacements was lawful, the Court set
forth the inherently-destructive-conduct standard.92 The Court stated that
"when an employer practice is so inherently destructive of employee
rights and is not justified by the service of important business ends, no
specific evidence of intent to discourage union membership is necessary
to establish a violation of section 8(a)(3). ' 93 In such instances, the Court
87. See NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 33-34 (citing Brown, 380 U.S. at
287). Relying on Brown, the Court in Great Dane went one step further in establishing
and defining the application of the "comparatively slight" and "inherently destructive"
conduct. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. at 33-34.
88. Brown, 380 U.S. at 285.
89. Id. at 287. The issue in Brown was whether an employer that was a member of a
multi-employer bargaining unit could hire temporary workers to replace locked out
employees when faced with a whipsaw strike. See id. at 282. A whipsaw strike is a
tactic used by a union to maximize its bargaining leverage when bargaining against
multiple employers that comprise a single bargaining unit. Paul M. Secunda, Politics Not
As Usual: Inherently Destructive Conduct, Institutional Collegiality, and the National
Labor Relations Board, 32 FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 51, 68, 106 n. 101 (2004). It usually
involves a union striking each employer consecutively. See id. Unions use this type of
strike as a means of inducing a settlement because it gives unstruck employers an unfair
advantage causing the struck members to acquiesce to the union's terms. See id.; see also
NLRB v. Truck Drivers Local (Buffalo Linen), 353 U.S. 87, 89-91 (1957) (discussing the
lockout doctrine with respect to the whipsaw strike).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 282.
92. Id. at 287.
93. Id. See Inter-Collegiate Press, 486 F.2d at 844-45 ("The phrase 'inherently
destructive' is not easily susceptible of precise definition. [Nonetheless,] 'inherently
destructive' conduct is that which creates visible and continuing obstacles to the future
exercise of employee rights."); see also Nat'l Fabricators, Inc. v. NLRB, 903 F.2d 396,
399 (5th Cir. 1990) (asserting that inherently destructive conduct falls into two
categories: (1) that which creates visible and continuing obstacles to the future exercise
of employee rights and (2) that which directly and unambiguously penalizes or deters
protected activity).
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found that "conduct so inherently destructive could not be saved from
illegality by an asserted overriding business purpose pursued in good
faith., 94  On the other hand, when the employer's conduct is
comparatively slight and used to achieve a legitimate business end or to
accommodate business exigencies, the Court found that antiunion
motivation of the employers must be established by independent
evidence.
95
After the Brown holding, two categories of discriminatory employer
conduct emerged: (1) employer conduct that is inherently destructive of
employee rights and (2) employer conduct that has a comparatively slight
effect on employee rights.96 Despite the seemingly clear opinion that
categorized employer conduct into two groups, the Brown opinion was
further interpreted only two years later by the Supreme Court in Great
Dane Trailers.
97
H. Great Dane Trailers: The Current Standard of Determining the
Lawfulness of a Lockout
In Great Dane Trailers, the Supreme Court of the United States
established guidelines for evaluating employer conduct in the context of
asserted NLRA violations. 98 Specifically, the Great Dane Court divided
discriminatory conduct directed at union employees into two categories
that require different analyses of review depending on the conduct's
impact on employee rights.99 The Supreme Court's decision in Great
Dane Trailers, to date, is the final word on some kinds of conduct
necessary for an employer to violate § 8(a)(3).1
00
Sustaining the Board's holding that an employer violates the NLRA
when the employer's conduct constitutes discrimination that would
discourage union membership and interfere with employees' protected
rights,' 1  the Supreme Court further expounded the "inherently
destructive" and "comparatively slight" standards of conduct.
102
94. Brown, 380 U.S. at 287. "The Board need not inquire into employer motivation
to support a finding of an unfair labor practice where the employer conduct is
demonstrably destructive of employee rights and is not justified by the service of
significant or important business ends." Id. at 282.
95. Id. at 287-88.
96. Id.
97. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. 26.
98. See Bud Antle, Inc., 347 N.L.R.B. No. 9, at 11 (May 30, 2006).
99. See id. (discussing Great Dane).
100. See Sociedad Espanola de Auxilio Mutuo, 342 NL.R.B. 458, 460 (July 13, 2004)
(stating that the employer's lockout must be determined using the Great Dane impact
test).
101. See Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 150 N.L.R.B. 438,443-45 (1964).
102. See Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 34.
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Specifically, the Court stated:
First, if it can reasonably be concluded that the employer's conduct
was "inherently destructive" of important employee rights, no proof
of an antiunion motivation is needed and the Board can find an unfair
labor practice even if the employer introduces evidence that the
conduct was motivated by business considerations. Second, if the
adverse effect of the discriminatory conduct on employee rights is
"comparatively slight," an antiunion motivation must be proved to
sustain the charge if the employer has come forward with evidence of
legitimate and substantial business justifications for the conduct.1
0 3
Under Great Dane Trailers, the legality of a lockout is determined
by first categorizing the employer's conduct as having either an
inherently destructive or comparatively slight adverse impact on
employee rights. 0 4  Where the Board determines that the employer's
conduct was inherently destructive of employee rights, the inquiry ends,
and the Board can find an unfair labor practice. 0 5 If, however, it is
determined that the employer's conduct had a comparatively slight
impact on employee rights, then the union most show that the employer
was motivated by anti-union animus after the employer has proffered




An employer engages in a partial lockout when it locks out some
but not all of its employees. 0 7 Although this doctrine is very narrow in
scope, partial lockouts are lawful 0 8 unless they are intended to "chill
103. Id. at 34.
104. See id.
105. Id.
106. Great Dane Trailers, Inc., 388 U.S. at 34.
107. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 56, at 490 (stating that during negotiations, in
an effort to exert pressure on the union while at the same time maintain plant operation,
an employer might choose to lock out part of the workforce); see Laclede Gas Co., 187
N.L.R.B. 243 (1970). Laclede Gas Co. involved an employer and union who had a long
bargaining relationship. Id. at 244. However, at the time the parties were negotiating a
new contract, prior to the termination of the current contract, the employer, in
anticipation of a strike, began to consolidate its street crews. Id. Accordingly, after the
contract expired, it made temporary reassignments of some of its employees so that it
could complete a job assignment before the expiration date with as little excavation
exposed as possible. Id. Subsequently, the employer and the union reached an impasse
and all street department employees who were working on construction crews were
locked out, while employees engaged in other work elsewhere were not. Id. No
allegations, nor any evidence, of unlawful motivation in its selection of which employees
to lockout was found. Id.
108. See Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B. at 244. The Board found a partial lockout
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unionism."' 09  In such instances, a partial lockout is deemed
discriminatory, and thus an unfair labor practice." ° The Board, however,
muddied the waters regarding the legality of partial lockouts in a pair of
cases decided in 2004. 11
A. Midwest Generation and Bunting Bearings: The Board Decisions
that Nearly Re-shaped the Partial Lockout Doctrine
The Midwest Generation saga begins just like every other case
mentioned within this Comment-with the employer and the union
meeting to negotiate a new collective-bargaining agreement." 2  In
Midwest, after a month of negotiating, the parties had yet to reach an
agreement.1 3 Subsequently, the union commenced a strike in support of
its bargaining position. 14 Approximately 1150 employees participated
in the strike, and eight employees continued working.' 15 After a month
of striking, the union made an unconditional offer to return to work
because it had yet to reach on agreement with the employer. 116 The
employer declined the offer and instituted a lockout of all employees
who were on strike.' 17 In a letter to the union, the employer indicated
that it "will not allow striking employees to return to work until a new
contract is agreed to. . . ,118 The letter also stated that the employees
who returned to work prior to the date of the union's offer to return
would be allowed to continue to work.119 Thereafter, the union filed
charges with the Board alleging that the employer's use of a partial
lawful where it "was motivated by a desire.., to protect the [employer] from over-
extending itself at a critical moment." Id. Given the circumstances, there was no
interference with employees' rights. Id. See also Bali Blinds Midwest, 292 N.L.R.B.
243 (1989) (holding an employer's partial lockout lawful where its selection of which
employees to layoff, i.e., lockout, was not based on whether to layoff strikers or non-
strikers).
109. See Textile Workers Union of Am. v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 275
(1965) ("[A] partial closing is an unfair labor practice under [§] 8(a)(3) if motivated by a
purpose to chill unionism . .
110. Id.
111. See Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. 69 (2004); Bunting Bearings Corp., 343
N.L.R.B. 479 (2004).
112. Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 69.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 69.
115. Id.
116. Id. Between June 28 and August 31, 2001, approximately 47 employees offered
to return to work and the employer accepted them back without regard to their union
membership (these employers are hereafter referred to as crossover employees). Id.
117. Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 70.
118. Id.
119. Id. Eventually a new collective-bargaining agreement was reached between the
parties and the employer ended the lockout. Id. at 70. All locked out employees who
opted to do so, returned to work. Id.
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lockout violated §§ 8(a)(l) and (3) of the NLRA. 20
In Bunting Bearings, an employer and union were parties to a
collective bargaining agreement.' 2' The existing collective bargaining
agreement required newly hired employees to serve a ninety-day
probationary period after which they were required to join the union.
122
With the existing contract set to expire, the employer and union
commenced negotiations. 123 After negotiations continued for almost a
month without any terms for a new agreement in place, an impasse had
been reached. 2 4  Thereafter, the employer submitted its final offer,
which the union rejected. 25 The next day, the employer locked out the
non-probationary employees while continuing its operation with the
probationary employees, supervisors, and employees from other
plants. 26 Following the termination of the lockout, the union filed a
complaint with the Board alleging that the employer violated §§ 8(a)(1)
and (3) of the NLRA. 27 The union asserted that the employer violated
the NLRA by implementing a partial lockout of the non-probationary
employees, who were also union members, but not probationary
employees, who were not union members.1
2 8
The Board in Bunting Bearings concluded that employer was
legally justified in locking out the non-probationary employees because
it was necessary in order to sustain business operations. 29 Similarly, in
Midwest Generation, the Board held that the employer's partial lockout
was fair because it was not motivated by antiunion animus.' 
30
B. Midwest Generation and Bunting Bearings Are Inconsistent with
Precedent
Although significant deference is ordinarily given to the Board in
fashioning remedies for violations of the NLRA, a decision cannot be
upheld when it is arbitrary and capricious, 
13 unsupported by the facts, 132
120. See id. at 70.
121. Bunting Bearings Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. at 479.
122. Id. Probationary employees did not have seniority which limited their
contractual rights. Id. Thus, the contractual provisions pertaining to the employer's
selection of employee for layoff, recall, filling of vacancies, and shift preference did not
apply to them. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 479-80.
126. Bunting Bearings Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. at 480.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 485.
130. See Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 72-73.
131. See supra Part II.D.
132. See id.
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or inconsistent with controlling precedent. 133 In the sections that follow,
observe how Midwest Generation and Bunting Bearings are at odds with
existing case law.
1. Bunting Bearings: A Comparison of the Facts in Schenk
Packing Co. and Bunting Bearings
In order to demonstrate the error in the Board's decision in Bunting
Bearings, this Comment will first analogize the facts of that case to
Schenk Packing Co.,13 4 a case where the Board ruled that a partial
lockout was unlawful.1 35 To reiterate the facts of Bunting Bearings, this
is the case where, in the midst of reaching a new collective bargaining
agreement, and after a bargaining impasse had been reached, the
employer locked out non-probationary employees who were also union
members, but did not lockout probationary employees who were not
union members.
1 36
In Schenk Packing Co., after the employer and union were unable to
negotiate a new agreement, the employer initiated a partial lockout by
laying off some of its employees but not others.1 37 During the course of
the partial lockout, the employer distributed a memorandum to
employees expressly indicating that the lock out would affect all union
members.1 38 The memorandum also provided that non-union employees
would be employed as replacements and that locked-out union
employees would only be considered for reinstatement if they
relinquished their union membership. 1
39
Honoring its word, the employer initiated a lockout of all union
employees,140 causing ten union-employees to resign their union status;
these employees were permitted to return to work.' 41 The Board found
133. United Steel, Paper and Forestry, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 11221, at *5 (stating
that a Board decision that conflicts with precedent is not entitled to deference).
134. Schenk Packing Co., 301 N.L.R.B. 487 (1991).
135. Id. at 488.
136. Bunting Bearings Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. at 480.
137. Schenk Packing Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 487.
138. Id. at 488.
139. Id. The memorandum also stated:
[I]t is important to understand that we cannot and are not by this letter
encouraging you one way or the other with respect to resigning from the
Union.... The question as to whether you remain members of the Union or
resign is totally yours to make and we are not taking a position one way or
another.
Id.
140. Schenk Packing Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 488.
141. Id.
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the lockout unlawful. 42 The Board concluded that the "unstated purpose
of the lockout" was to discourage union membership by denying
employment to those who refused to renounce their status as union
members. 1
43
In comparing the facts of Schenk Packing Co. to Bunting Bearings,
it is difficult to see how facts so similar could yield such opposite
conclusions. 144 Although Schenk Packing Co. involved a more explicit
form of antiunion animus, i.e., a memorandum indicating the employer's
intent to lock out only union employees, Bunting Bearings is far from
indistinguishable.145 In Bunting Bearings, the employer locked out non-
probationary employees who, by happenstance, were also union
members.146 The employer did allow, however, probationary employees
to work.14 7 The common thread between the two cases is that in both
cases, whether intended or not, the employer's conduct discouraged
union membership. Bolstering the inherent error in the decision by the
Bunting Bearings Board is that such conduct was red flagged by the
Supreme Court in Am. Ship Bldg. 1
48
In discussing the import of examining the employer's motivation for
establishing its lockout, the Am. Ship Bldg. Court postulated as an unfair
labor practice the situation when an employer locks out only union
members, or employees simply because they were union members.
49
Coincidentally, the situation that the Supreme Court classified as
discriminatory in Am. Ship Bldg. is the same situation that was before the
Board in Bunting Bearings.150 Yet, the Board found that the employer in
Bunting Bearings did not select who it would lockout on the basis of
142. Id.
143. Id. at 490.
144. Compare Schenk Packing Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 488 (holding that the lockout was
unlawful), with Bunting Bearings Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. at 483 (holding that the partial
lockout union members was legally justified).
145. See Schenk Packing Co. 301 N.L.R.B. at 488.
146. Bunting Bearings Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. at 480.
147. Id.
148. SeeAm. ShipBldg.,380U.S. at312.
149. See id. In distinguishing the facts of Am. Ship Bldg. from circumstances where
the partial lockout would be unlawful, the Court stated:
The purpose and effect of the lockout were only to bring pressure upon the
union.... [I]t does not appear that the natural tendency of the lockout is
severely to discourage union membership while serving no significant
employer interest .... [Additionally], [t]here is no claim that the employer
locked out only union members, or locked out any employee simply because he
was a union member; nor is it alleged that the employer conditioned rehiring
upon resignation from the union.
Id.
150. See Schenk Packing Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 491.
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union membership;' 5 ' rather, the Board based its holding on the
distinction between probationary employees and non-probationary
employees.1 2  Conversely, as pointed out by the dissent in Bunting
Bearings, "the obvious basis for deciding which bargaining-unit
employees were locked out was union-membership status. Every non-
probationary employee, and thus every union member, was locked out.
Every probationary employee... whom the [e]mployer believed to be [a
non-union member] ... [was] instructed to report to work.'
53
In sum, the facts presented by both cases demonstrate an employer
who indicated its intent to lockout only union members. The Board in
Schenk Packing Co. concluded that the employer's conduct violated the
NLRA because it discouraged union membership. 5 4 Thus, it logically
follows that the Board in Bunting Bearings would conclude similarly.
The Board, however, ruled to the contrary.'
55
2. Midwest Generation: A Comparison of the Facts in Erie
Resistor and Midwest Generation
In switching the focus to Midwest Generation,56 a close review of
its facts will reveal a strikingly close resemblance to those presented in
Erie Resistor. 157 In Erie Resistor, after the employer and the union were
unable to reach an agreement on a successive contract, the union
implemented a strike. 58 To counter the strike, the employer decided to
use non-striking members in order to maintain its business production.
159
After doing such, the employer notified the union that it was going to
give some form of super-seniority to replacements, but not to union
members. 60  Following implementation of the plan, the strike
collapsed. 161
Thereafter, the union filed a charge with the Board alleging that
awarding super-seniority status during the course of the strike constituted
151. Bunting Bearings Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. at 480-81.
152. Id. at 481.
153. Id. at 485.
154. See Schenk Packing Co., 301 N.L.R.B. at 488.
155. See Bunting Bearings Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. at 480.
156. Midwest Generation was the case where the union initiated a strike in support of
its bargaining position. Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 69. Subsequently, the
employer expressed in a letter to the union that it was going to allow only non-striking
employees to return to work but not striking employees. Id. at 70.
157. NLRB v. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. 221 (1963).
158. See id. at 222.
159. See id. at 223.
160. See id.
161. Seeid. at 224.
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an unfair labor practice. 162  The Board ruled in favor of the union,
holding that the super-seniority award to temporary replacements, in this
context, was an unfair labor practice. 63 The Third Circuit reversed the
Board's holding.' 64  The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the
Board's finding that the employer's conduct was axiomatic and that
"whatever the claimed overriding justification may be," it is
discriminatory and it does discourage union membership.
165
Despite the Board's expansive adjudicatory discretion, it is still
bound by stare decisis.16 6 Although "[s]tare decisis is not an inexorable
command,"'167 the Board cannot depart from precedent "without some
explanation of what it is doing and why."' 168 With this in mind, the union
in Midwest Generation thought it had a slam-dunk case. After all, note
the extent to which facts of Erie Resistor and Midwest Generation are
analogous. 169 The employer's conduct in both cases was detrimental to
striking employees, yet benefited non-striking employees.' 70 And both
employers defended their actions by advancing so-called legitimate
business justifications. In Erie Resistor, the employer asserted that it
retained employees that would enable it to maintain its manufacturing
plant; and in Midwest Generation, the employer asserted that it directed
the lockout only at striking employees in order pressure them to abandon
the Union's bargaining demands. 171 Despite the similarities between
both cases, the Board in Erie Resistor concluded that the employer
violated the Act;172 yet, in Midwest Generation, the Board ruled that
162. Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 224.
163. Id. at 225.
164. See Int'l Union of Elec., Radio & Mach. Workers, Local 613 v. NLRB, 303 F.2d
359 (3d Cir. 1962).
165. See Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 228.
166. See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am.
v. NLRB, 802 F.2d 969, 974 (7th Cir. 1986).
167. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
168. See Int'l Union, United Auto., Aerospace and Agric. Implement Workers of Am.,
802 F.2d at 974 ("[A]n administrative agency is not allowed to change direction without
some explanation of what it is doing and why.").
169. For further discussion of Erie Resistor, see 3-20 National Labor Relations Act:
Law & Practice § 20.03 at 19 (LEXIS 2006).
170. Compare Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 223 (noting that it was going to give some
form of super-seniority to replacements, but not union members), with Midwest
Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 70 (stating in a letter to the union that it was going to allow
only non-striking employees to return to work but not striking employees). See National
Labor Relations Act, supra note 169, at 19 (LEXIS 2006).
171. Compare Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 226-27 (insisting that its overriding purpose
was to keep its plant open and that business necessity justified its conduct), with Midwest
Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 70 (explaining that its lockout was in furtherance of
securing its lawful bargaining proposals).
172. See Erie Resistor, 373 U.S. at 225.
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there had been no violation.
173
3. Midwest Generation: A Comparison of the Facts in Allen
Storage & Moving Co. and Midwest Generation
In Allen Storage & Moving Co.,174 union employees instituted a
strike after the employer and union could not agree to terms of a new
contract. 175 Only one union member refused to strike, and the employer
allowed him to continue working. 7 6 Subsequently, the union filed for
alleged violations of §§ 8(a)(1) and (3). 177 The Administrative Law
Judge (ALJ) found the evidence conclusive that by permitting one union
employee, who had not participated in the strike, to continue working,
while banning all other strikers, 178 the employer's lockout was motivated
by an unlawful discriminatory purpose. 79  The Board adopted and
affirmed the ALJ's reasoning.1 80
"The obligation to follow precedent begins with necessity.... No
judicial system could do society's work if it eyed each issue afresh in
every case that raised it."' 181 In other words, tribunals are obligated to use
prior holdings to decide similar issues. That said, how does one
reconcile the holdings in Allen Storage and Midwest Generation? While
the Board in Allen Storage held that the employer's conduct was driven
by an unlawful discriminatory intent, the Midwest Generation Board
concluded to the contrary.
1 82
Recall that Midwest Generation is the case where the employer
allowed all non-striking employees, and all striking employees who
stopped striking, to continue working during a lockout, but refused to
allow striking employees to return work.1 83 In identifying the similarities
between both cases, both employers were engaged in futile collective
bargaining.1 84 In response to such futile bargaining efforts, the union in
both cases instituted a strike in support of its bargaining position, a right
173. See Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 72-73.
174. Allen Storage & Moving Co., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 44 (July 16, 2004) (Westlaw).
175. Id. at 508.
176. See id.
177. Seeid. at 501.
178. Id. at 501.
179. Allen Storage & Moving Co., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 44 at 501.
180. Id. at 516.
181. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854 (1992).
182. See Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 73 (refusing to make a finding that the
employer's lockout was unlawfully motivated).
183. Id. at 70.
184. Compare Allen Storage & Moving Co., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 44 at 506 (stating that
a collective bargaining agreement had not been reached), with Midwest Generation, 343
N.L.R.B. at 70 (noting that as of Aug. 31, 2001, the employer and union had yet to reach
an agreement).
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that is granted under § 7 and protected by § 8 of the NLRA.' 85 In both
cases, the employer favorably treated the non-striking employees. 86 The
Board in Allen Storage found the partial lockout unlawful because it was
motivated by an unlawful discriminatory purpose. 187  Conversely, the
Board in Midwest Generation found the partial lockout lawful despite an
unlawful discriminatory purpose. 1
88
Comparable to both Midwest Generation and Allen Storage, the
General Counsel of the NLRB stated in an advisory letter that an
employer committed an unfair labor practice when it locked out only
former striking employees. 89 The General Counsel concluded that the
partial lockout was discriminatorily motivated because it was not
exercised in accord with business needs. 190 Furthermore, the General
Counsel determined that the only basis the employer had for locking out
the employees was because they had exercised their § 7 right to strike.191
Although Midwest Generation and Bunting Bearings were
overturned, the purpose of this section was to illustrate the scrutiny under
which partial lockouts have been reviewed in the past. The cases serve
to identify the fine line between lawful and unlawful labor practices,
especially when the employer uses the partial lockout. Consequently, by
including this section, the employer is given examples of what not to do
when executing a partial lockout. After reading the next section the
employer will have an idea of what to do when using a partial lockout
and an economic weapon.
C. Lawful Partial Lockouts
By now, the employer is probably questioning the lawfulness of the
partial lockout and when can it be used without violating the NLRA.
185. Compare Allen Storage & Moving Co., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 44 at 508 (stating that
after giving notice of intention to strike the strike commenced), with Midwest Generation,
343 N.L.R.B. at 69 (stating that the union commenced a strike in support of its bargaining
position).
186. Compare Allen Storage & Moving Co., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 44 at 508 (noting that
one employee was the only union employee who did not participate in the strike and the
only union employee whom the employer did not include in the lockout), with Midwest
Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 70 (noting that the employer instituted a lockout of only
those individuals on strike).
187. See Allen Storage & Moving Co., 342 N.L.R.B. No. 44 at 516; see also McGwier
Co., Inc., 204 N.L.R.B. 492, 496 (1973) (affirming the ALJ's conclusion that an
employer had discriminated against employees for striking, in violation of § 8(a)(1) and
(3), where the employer locked out only those employees who joined the strike).
188. See Midwest Generation, 343 N.L.R.B. at 712-13.
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According to Developing Labor Law's 2006 Midwinter Meeting of the
Committee on the Development of the Law under the NLRA, partial
lockouts must be considered with two major guidelines in mind:
(1) First, an employer will usually be required to show that it has a
legitimate reason for the lockout; and (2) the purpose of locking out
union employees cannot be driven by anti-union animus nor can it be an
act of retaliation against union employees for engaging in protected
activities. 192 Furthermore, the Board has validated partial lockouts in
instances where evidence demonstrates that an employer is using the
partial lockout to protect itself in areas with strike sensitive employees,
and not to undermine the union. 193 The authority for the legality of the
latter partial lockout is found in Bali Blinds.
In anticipation of a repetition of a prior strike, the employer in Bali
Blinds partially locked out certain employees in strike sensitive positions
but did not lockout employees in less vulnerable areas. 94 The employer
asserted that by locking out certain employees, it was able to reduce the
workforce to a stable and operable condition while maintaining its
business production.' 95  The Board held this to be a valid partial
lockout. 1
96
In adopting the ALJ's reasoning, and relying on Am. Ship Bldg., the
Board concluded that the partial lockout was lawful because the
employer had a substantial and legitimate business justification sufficient
to demonstrate its actions were in furtherance of an economic
objective.197
Similar to Bali Blinds, in Laclede Gas Co., in anticipating the
chance of a strike after the current collective bargaining agreement
expired, the employer began to consolidate some of its employees and
temporarily reassign its personnel in order to complete construction jobs
and reduce public hazards. 198 Consequently, the employer locked out
192. LouiSE A. FERNANDEZ, DEVELOPING LABOR LAW: 2006 MIDWINTER MEETING OF
THE COMMITTEE ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW UNDER THE NLRA, Feb. 27, 2006,
www.bna.com/bnabooks/ababna/nlra/2006/fernandez.pdf.
193. See generally Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B. 243; Bali Blinds Midwest, 292
N.L.R.B. 243.
194. Bali Blinds Midwest, 292 N.L.R.B. at 246.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. Id. at 244 (stating that the employer's economic justification for the lockout of
some employees and not others was based on a reasonable fear of recurring strikes that
would disrupt its production and delivery schedules to the extent that the employer would
face a serious loss of customers).
198. Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B. at 243. See also Wayne Distributing Co. 1988
WL 228528, at *2 (N.L.R.B.G.C. April 28, 1988) (Advisory Memorandum) (applying the
principles from Laclede Gas Co., a partial lockout is lawful where there is a lack of
evidence to prove that an unlawful motive for allowing some but not all of its employees
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some employees while allowing others to work. 199 The Board found the
lockout lawful because evidence was lacking that the employer's
selection of employees was driven by unlawful motivation. 200 The Board
concluded that the lock out of some employees but not others was
"necessitated by the exigencies of the business operation" and was
motivated by a desire to protect itself from over-extending itself at a
critical moment.20'
In sum, a review of the foregoing cases demonstrates several points.
Among them is the limited scope of the partial lockout; this is readily
shown by the paucity of cases that have found the partial lockout
lawful.20 2 Also apparent is that in both Bali Blinds and Laclede Gas, the
employer used its business judgment to assess who it would retain and
who it would lockout;20 3 and perhaps most important, in both cases the
Board was unable to find any evidence of discriminatory conduct toward
union members.20 4
D. Expansion of the Partial Lockout Doctrine
Absent the reversal of Midwest Generation and Bunting Bearings,
the countervailing economic weapons split between the employer and
employee would have tipped in favor of the employer. As noted above,
an employer engages in a partial lockout when it locks out some but not
all of its employees in support of its bargaining position.0 5 Partial
to work during the lockout).
199. See Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B. at 243.
200. Id. at 243-44.
201. Id. at 243.
202. See Bali Blinds Midwest, 292 N.L.R.B. at 246; Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B. at
243-44.
203. See Bali Blinds Midwest, 292 N.L.R.B. at 246 (stating that it was the employer's
position to temporarily reduce the workforce to a stable base that would enable the
company to continue production and delivery); Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B. at 244
(noting that the layoffs were based solely on the [employer's] work assignment at the
time).
204. See Bali Blinds Midwest, 292 N.L.R.B. at 246 (stating that the employer's
method of selection was nondiscriminatory); Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B. at 244
(noting that the layoffs were without regard to union membership status of any
individual). One commentator observed that the Board's decisions in Midwest
Generation and Bunting Bearings indicate that, despite what the evidence may or may
not show, the Board has a propensity "to find that lockouts generally have only a
comparatively slight impact on protected rights absent specific proof of anti-union
animus." Melinda S. Hensel, "If I Only Had a Heard.... How Many of My Employees
Would I Lock Out? The Board's Heartless Attack on the Fundamental Section 7 Rights
to Engage in Protected Concerted Activity, 2006 MID-WINTER MEETING ON THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE LAW UNDER THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT 17.
205. See GORMAN & FINKIN, supra note 56, at 490 (during negotiations, in an effort to
exert pressure on the union while at the same time maintain plant operation, an employer
might choose to lock out part of the workforce).
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lockouts are lawful unless an employer engages in the conduct in order to
chill unionism, in which case a partial lockout is deemed a
discriminatory, unfair labor practice.20 6
Based upon the forgoing case law, courts have upheld lawful partial
lockouts in situations where the employer anticipated a strike or had a
legitimate business justification, such as maintaining business
operations. 207 The Board decisions in Midwest Generation and Bunting
Bearings, however, would have effectively broadened both the
circumstances in which an employer may rationally resort to a partial
lockout and the conduct employers may engage in when instituting a
partial lockout. 20 8 For example, in order to show how the Bunting
Bearings decision has expanded the partial lockout application, refer
back to Bali Blinds and Laclede Gas Co. In Bali Blinds, the employer's
partial lockout was justified because there was evidence that it ensured
that repeated work stoppages would not delay production and would not
result in a loss of customers.20 9 Similarly, in Laclede Gas Co., the Board
found that the need to ensure continuing business operations and avoid
public hazards justified the employer's partial lockout.210 In Bunting
Bearings, however, the employer asserted that retaining the probationary
employees was necessary in order to maintain its business, but failed to
substantiate its assertion with any evidence.21' In fact, by selecting
probationary employees over non-probationary employees, the employer
chose the least-trained workers;212 therefore, the only basis for its
selection of who to lockout, i.e., non-probationary employees (or union
members), was instigated by antiunion animus rather than by business
exigencies.213 Consequently, if the federal appellate court failed to
overturn Bunting Bearings, the Board would have extended the utility of
the lockout beyond a "specialized need to maintain business
operation."214
Another ramification of the Board's holdings in Midwest
Generation and Bunting Bearings is that the partial lockout would have
206. See Textile Workers Union of Am., 380 U.S. at 275 (stating that a partial closing
is an unfair labor practice under 8(a)(3) if motivated by a purpose to chill unionism).
207. See generally Bali Blinds, 292 N.L.R.B. 243; Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B.
243.
208. Ellen Dannin, Expanding the Partial Lockout, LABOR AND THE LAW: NEWS AND
CURRENT EVENTS FROM THE IRRA SECTION ON LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, Nov.
2004, available at http://www.lera.uiuc.edu/Pubs/newsletters/LELNewsletters/
2004/2004-1 l.htm.
209. Bali Blinds, 292 N.L.R.B. at 246-47.
210. See Laclede Gas Co., 187 N.L.R.B. at 243-44.
211. Bunting Bearings Corp., 343 N.L.R.B. at 486.
212. Seeid. at486.
213. See id.
214. See Dannin, supra note 208.
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been shifted to the status of a standard, rather than special, economic
weapon that can be prompted whenever employees vote against an
employer's offer for a new contract.21 5 Notably, this expansion would
have prompted an imbalance in the quasi-equal bargaining power
between the employer and labor union in favor of employers; it would
have allowed the employer to use the partial lockout as a bargaining
weapon, while partial strikes would have long been a forbidden
economic weapon for union employees.21 6
A partial strike occurs when employees attempt to simultaneously
work and strike as a means of applying economic pressure on their
employer.1 7 Courts have found that employees perform a partial strike
by, for instance, refusing to work overtime21 8 or accepting some tasks
and refusing to perform others.2 19 A partial strike is not protected by the
Act; therefore, an employer may punish its employees for engaging in
this type of conduct without violating the Act.22°
Consequently, if the decisions in Bunting Bearings and Midwest
Generation were to stand, and the expansion of the partial lockout were
valid, Congress would be obliged to reconsider the legality of the partial
strike because courts have often used one party's rights to use economic
weapons to determine the rights of the other party.
221
215. See Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 429 F.3d at 661 ("Under the Board's
analysis, an employer could choose to lock out union leaders or only employees it
believes voted against a proposed contract."); see also Dannin, supra note 208.
216. See Dannin, supra note 208; see also Vencare Ancillary Serv., Inc., v. NLRB,
353 F.3d 318, 323-24 (6th Cir. 2003) (acknowledging that the Board and courts have
repeatedly condemned partial strikes); Audobon Health Care Ctr., 268 N.L.R.B. 135, 137
(1983) ("While employees may protest and ultimately seek to change any term or
condition of their employment by striking or engaging in a work stoppage, the strike or
stoppage must be complete, that is, the employees must withhold all their services from
their employer [to be protected]."). For further discussion on the legality of the partial
lockout, see 2 THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW, supra note 25, at 1486-90.
217. See NLRB v. Local Union No. 1229, 346 U.S. 464, 476 n. 12 (1953) ("An
employee can not work and strike at the same time. He can not continue in his
employment and openly or secretly refuse to do his work. He can not collect wages for
his employment, and, at the same time, engage in activities to injure his or destroy his
employer's business.").
218. See, e.g., C.G. Conn, Ltd. v. NLRB, 108 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1939) (noting that
employees' refusal to accept work overtime is not protected by the Act).
219. See, e.g., Yale Univ., No. 34-CA-7347, 1997 N.L.R.B. LEXIS 619, at *38-41
(holding that performing some tasks while refusing to perform others is a partial strike
that is unprotected by the Act).
220. Blades Mfg. Corp., 344 F.2d at 1005 ("[Partial strikes] by the employees to exert
pressure on the employer to accept the union's bargaining demands were unprotected
concerted activities, and the employer was free to discharge the participating employees
for their unlawful . . . tactics.").
221. See Am. Ship Bldg., 380 U.S. at 316-17 ("[The primary purpose of the Act was
to] redress the perceived imbalance of economic power between labor and
management .... ). In order to reconcile the imbalance, the Act conferred certain
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E. With Some Help from the Federal Circuit Courts, theLaw
Regarding the Partial Lockout is Ascertainable.
Cognizant of the Board's arbitrary decisions in Midwest Generation
and Bunting Bearings, circuit courts of appeal were left with only one
choice: to reverse the Board's decisions.222 Evident in the language of
the Seventh Circuit's review of Midwest Generation is a level of urgency
to return the partial lockout doctrine to its pre-Midwest Generation
state.223 Consequently, the Seventh Circuit's opinion was motivated by a
concern that if the Board's decision in Midwest Generation were to
stand, the partial lockout doctrine would suffer an expansion.22 4 Absent
a reversal by the Seventh Circuit, employers, acting under the facade of
maintaining business operations, would have Board approval to engage
in exactly the type of action Midwest undertook-punishing those who
225stood with the Union and rewarding those who did not. Accordingly,
the court was obliged to recoil the doctrine to its narrowly-construed
state.226
Through the decisions in Midwest Generation and Bunting
Bearings, the Board instituted a new standard for measuring the
lawfulness of a partial lockout; 227 the Board, however, neglected to set
forth any apparent limitations that would preclude the employer from
exceeding the scope of its rights afforded by the NLRA.22 ' Nevertheless,
in reversing the Board's decision in Midwest Generation, the Seventh
Circuit stated that when an employer engages in a partial lockout, it must
provide a reason beyond economic effectiveness. 229 Also, in order to
substantiate a partial lockout's lawfulness on the basis of operational
affirmative rights on employees and placed certain restrictions on the activities of
employers. Id. Moreover, the Act protected employee organization by countervailing
employee organization to the employers' bargaining power. Id.
222. See Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 429 F.3d at 662; United Steel, Paper
and Forestry, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 11221, at *5. In a brief opinion, the D.C. Circuit
found that the Board's ruling in Bunting Bearings Corp. was at odds with precedent.
Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit remanded the case back to the Board. Id.
223. See Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 429 F.3d at 660 (discussing how the
Board embarked on a new approach to reviewing the legality of lockouts).
224. See id, at 661 (noting that, under the Board's analysis, an employer could choose
to lock out only union employees that it believes voted against a proposed contract).
225. See id. at 659.
226. Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elee. Workers, 429 F.3d at 662 (upholding that the
Board's analysis in Midwest Generation would be in derogation of nearly four decades of
employee protection).
227. See id. at 660 ("[U]nder the Board's analysis, an employer could choose to
lockout only union leaders or only employees it believes voted against a proposed
contract."). Id. at 661.
228. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (2006).
229. Id.
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need, "an employer must provide a reasonable basis for finding some
employees necessary to continue ... and others unnecessary. 23 °
F. The Convenient Truth: The Guide to Implementing a Successful
Partial Lockout
Having read the foregoing sections, the employer that negotiates
with a labor union should be fully aware that union members who
exercise their right to strike do not in any way disable the employer's
right under the law to continue its business operations.231 Since nothing
in the law requires the employer to choose between conceding to the
union and going out of business, the employer is guaranteed the right to
continue to operate and do business inasmuch as the union is guaranteed
the right to strike; 232 therefore, when the employer decides to use only
some of its employees to maintain business, the employer should take
several considerations into account.
First, the employer must be equipped to carry on business.233 In
other words, prior to implementing the partial lockout, the employer
should consider in advance how, when, and where to store and secure
234certain supplies. In addition, the employer should consider trivial, yet
logistical matters, such as financial emergencies, transportation for
personnel, and, in some instances, the season and weather.235
Second, the employer should prepare to step up production in
advance of starting the partial lockout so that it can maximize its
236inventory. Such a production increase will help the employer bridge
the gap in production that will occur once the employer decides to
implement the partial lockout.237
Third, the employer should give thorough consideration to which
employees it intends to keep and which employees it intends to
230. Id. at 659.
231. See discussion supra Part ILE.
232. ROTHENBERG & SILVERMAN, supra note 61, at 239.
233. See id. at 245.
234. See Duluth Bottling Ass'n, 48 N.L.R.B. 1335 (discussing a lockout where an
employer locked out it employees in anticipation of strike that would have caused
spoilage of syrup to be used in the manufacture of soft drinks).
235. ROTHENBERG & SILVERMAN, supra note 61, at 247.
The authors recall one such employer who had done a fantastic job of advance
preparation. He was completely convinced that nothing had been
overlooked... [until a] spell of freezing weather violently disabused him when
the plant's fuel oil tanks ran dry, forcing a plant-shut down. ...
Id.
236. See id. at 247.
237. See id.
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lockout.238  The employer would implement a much sounder partial
lockout if it can rationally ascertain and justify which, and how many,
employees it needs during the partial lockout in order to maintain its
business operation. 239 The employer can do this by inquiring from the
employees, in advance of the partial lockout, who would consider
working during the lockout.
Finally, and perhaps more significant than the aforementioned
considerations, is the notion that the employer must be able to supply a
legitimate reason for retaining some employees and not others during the
partial lockout. 240 Thus, in choosing its employees, the employer should
be cognizant of the type of actions that may propel its conduct into the
realm of an unfair labor practice.241  Stated differently, under no
circumstances should the employer discriminate or make threats of
discrimination against employees exercising their § 7 rights;2 42 nor
should the employer determine the workers it will employ during the
partial lockout on the basis of union membership. 243 Any of these acts
would convert an otherwise lawful "partial lockout" into an unfair labor
practice with a possibility of all of the consequences attaching thereto.244
IV. Conclusion
The National Labor Relations Act is the median between the parties
to collective bargaining.245 Thus an employer's right to lockout is a
corollary of the union's right to strike.246 The Act's only limitation on
both parties is that the weapons must be used for legitimate bargaining
238. See id. at 252.
239. ROTHENBERG & SILVERMAN, supra note 61, at 253.
240. See Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 429 F.3d at 659 ("[When
implementing a partial lockout,] an employer must provide a reasonable basis for finding
some employees necessary to continue and operations and others unnecessary.").
241. ROTHENBERG & SILVERMAN, supra note 61, at 254 ("[T]here are several cautions
which should be ... observed: (1) no discrimination or threats of discrimination of any
kind should be visited or made against the strikers; nor should there by any "coercion" or
an "interference" of any kind .. "),
242. See 29 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
243. See Local 15, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 429 F.3d at 661 ("Under the Board's
analysis, an employer could choose to lockout only union [employees].... This type of
discrimination cannot be a legitimate and substantial business justification for a partial
lockout."); United Steel, 2006 U.S. App. LEXIS 11221, at *4 (holding that a partial
lockout is unlawful where there is a perfect correlation between union membership and
which employees were locked out).
244. See NLRB v. Express Publ'g Co. 312 U.S. 426 (1941). Upon the finding of
unfair labor practice, the Board is free to restrain the conduct and other like or related
unlawful acts. Id. at 436. However, the breadth of the order must depend on the
circumstances of each case. Id.
245. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169.
246. See discussion supra Part II.E.
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247
purposes. For employers, that means that they may not use lockouts
deliberately to steer employees from the union or to subvert employee
rights procured by the NLRA.2 48
To the extent that the directives set forth in the Seventh Circuit's
decision reversing Midwest Generation represent an accurate assessment
of the law, those principles appear to establish the parameters regarding
the partial lockout doctrine. And while partial lockouts are more risky
than total lockouts, the future of the partial lockout as a lawful economic
weapon in collective bargaining depends on how prepared employers are
to face the challenges inventoried in this Comment.
Consequently, to keep from crossing the line into the unfair-labor-
practice danger zone, employers should (1) not distinguish between
union members and union non-members, (2) verify the partial lockout's
reasonableness in the context of bargaining, and (3) clearly disclose its
bargaining goals for the lockout.2 49  While these guidelines do not
guarantee the maintenance of a lawful partial lockout, they will help
counteract any claim alleging an unfair labor practice pursuant to a
partial lockout.
247. See Terry E. Thomason, Court Upholds Employer Right to 'Lock Out'
Employees During Bargaining, PACIFIC EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER, June 2000, available
at 4 No. 12 SMPACEMPLL 1 (Westlaw).
248. See discussion supra Part III.C.
249. See Thomason, supra note 247.
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